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CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD:
AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE
CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD: RECLAIMING THE
SPACE BETWEEN PERSON AND STATE. By Robert K. Vischer.
Cambridge University Press. 2010.
PATRICK MCKINLEY BRENNANt
"Conscience" and the "common good." Two very bright ideas
but in need of definition and detail if they are to be found to be
true ideas.
As readers of a journal such as this are no doubt aware, since
1931, the Catholic Church has understood that she is developing
a body of social "doctrine"' handed down from the time of Pope
Leo XIII-1878 to 1903. Writing in 1991, Pope John Paul II
explained that
to teach and to spread her social doctrine pertains to the
Church's evangelizing mission and is an essential part of the
Christian message, since this doctrine points out the direct
consequences of that message in the life of society and situates
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daily work and struggles for justice in the context of bearing
witness to Christ the Savior.2
With her social doctrine, John Paul continued, the Church
"proclaims God and his mystery of salvation in Christ to every
human being, and for that very reason reveals man to himself."3
Drawing on "contributions from all branches of knowledge,
whatever their source,"4 the Church in her social doctrine speaks
not just to Catholics but to all people about how society is to be
rightly ordered in light of what things truly are and are called to
be-that is, how society is to be ordered to the common good.
The questions I wish to raise here concern the compatibility,
so to speak, between several of the principal positions taken by
Robert Vischer in his provocative book Conscience and the
Common Good, on the one hand, and several important theses of
Catholic social doctrine, on the other. Whatever Vischer's intent
in taking the positions he does in the book, it is surely fair to ask
of a serious study in social questions, such as Vischer's, the
extent to which it is one with which Catholics loyal to the
Church's social doctrine can agree. The inquiry may prove to be
inconclusive or underdetermined or uninteresting; in the
alternative, it may turn out be to probative. It is especially
promising to ask about a study's compatibility with Catholic
doctrine, moreover, when, as here, its two poles, conscience and
the common good, name concepts that occupy, at least nominally,
key positions in Catholic social doctrine. We are not comparing
apples and oranges, at least not necessarily. It may turn out that
we are comparing Fujis and Granny Smiths, so to speak, and to
discover the differences between the two kinds just might turn
out to be of value. Why? Changing the metaphor, sometimes
wolves come wearing sheep's clothing. In trade in Vischer's
account are concepts that occupy high places in Catholic social
doctrine, above all, conscience and the common good. Do
Vischer's conceptions differ substantively from the concepts of




4 PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE & PEACE, COMPENDIUM OF THE SOCIAL
DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH [ 76 (2004).
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the Catholic tradition? It would be good news to some if they did.
I would hate to deliver bad news. Still, it bears mentioning that
some fruit is not to be eaten.
So, my questions here conveniently cluster around the
implications of the two poles of Vischer's study, but one
preliminary issue concerns what exactly Vischer means, as a
matter of metaphysics and epistemology, by "conscience," the
first pole. I will proceed rather summarily on this preliminary
point. "This book," Vischer writes, "does not aim to overturn the
prevailing understanding of conscience as a person's judgment of
right and wrong, but it does," he continues, "aim to bring into
focus a dimension of conscience that is discernible from the
term's earliest usage, which is 'to denote a knowledge which can
be shared by several people.' "' Vischer thematizes this as "the
relational dimension of conscience,"' which he elaborates as
follows: "[C]onscience cannot be adequately explained as a
freestanding individual construct. It might be expressed and
defended by the individual, but its substance and real-world
implications are relational by their very nature." This insistence
on the inevitably relational dimensions of conscience is one of the
signature contributions of Vischer's book, and I regard as truly
salutary this reminder that conscience is not properly formed by
an individual in splendid isolation.' Though each of us must take
final, non-delegable responsibility for our decisions about what to
do and what not to do, our consciences are formed, willy-nilly, by
the associations in which we engage. Needless to say, therefore,
the better our associations, the better our consciences are likely
to be.
This insight, into the "relationality" of conscience, leads to
Vischer's principal project in the book-that is, to defend the
place of associations and groups, anticipating that they will be
actors in a "moral marketplace."9  No invisible hand is
mentioned, but the market, with groups, and not just individuals,
firmly a part of it, is what is to be trusted, trusted as the means
by which groups develop their own identities and that of their
6 ROBERT K. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD 3 (2010).
6 Id.
Id. at 4.
8 How one could possibly come to hold the view Vischer asks us to reject, is a
story for another day.
' Id. at 5.
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members. If this trust is not limitless, what then is to be the
limit of this freedom of group action? For example, no one
seriously denies some things groups sometimes do-such as
torturing babies-cannot and should not be tolerated. In one
especially intriguing passage in which he relies on the arguments
of Harold Laski among many others, Vischer cautions against
"restricting the authority of associations to embody their own
distinct-even deviant-moral identities." 0 What are we to
make of this from the perspective of Catholic social doctrine?
Catholic social doctrine does not disagree about the
importance of associations and groups-terms I use
interchangeably for present purposes. In fact, quite the opposite
is the case. The Church has been at the forefront of modern
defenses of social pluralism-that is, the pluralism of social
forms-and Vischer's own account, specifically of "subsidiarity,"
acknowledges the Church's teaching that the individual is who
he or she is in virtue, in part, of his or her associations:
"Subsidiarity pushes back against the temptation to view the
individual as a decontextualized rational agent by reminding us
that the human person is, above all, relational-not just as an
empirical description, but as a normative claim.""
Catholic social doctrine does, however, situate the problem-
and therefore the solution-somewhat differently, and it does so
in light of an association whose uniqueness Vischer ignores,
elides or, perhaps, the reader can only guess, denies. In Catholic
social doctrine, the question of the formation of conscience is
intimately and preeminently linked with the work of the Church,
an association sui generis. Not all "relationality" is created
equal; in Catholic social doctrine, "subsidiarity" is not, at least
not principally, about "closest proximity" or a "preference for the
local." 2 The Church is the associational place par excellence
where conscience is to be formed, and this not because it is or is
not local or proximate but because of divine right. To bring this
point into bold relief, some ground clearing is first required.
1o Id. at 115.
n Id. at 105.
12 Id. at 106.
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One of the most celebrated doctrinal declarations of the
Second Vatican Council concerned liberty of conscience. In its
Declaration on Religious Freedom, Dignitatis Humanae, the
Council declared:
In all his activity a man is bound to follow his conscience in
order that he may come to God, the end and purpose of life. It
follows that he is not to be forced to act in a manner contrary to
his conscience. Nor, on the other hand, is he to be restrained
from acting in accordance with his conscience, especially in
matters religious. 3
This declaration in particular led the notorious anti-Catholic
bigot Paul Blanshard to announce: "The final statement on
religious liberty was an important achievement. It will make the
struggle for religious liberty throughout the world easier. From
now on every libertarian can cite an official Catholic
pronouncement endorsing the principle of liberty.""
Perhaps, but Blanshard missed the other declaration of
liberty, on which Dignitatis Humanae was strikingly
unequivocal: "The freedom of the Church is the fundamental
principle in what concerns the relations between the Church and
governments and the whole civil order."15 Dignitatis Humanae
continued in this vein: "In human society and in the face of
government the Church claims freedom for herself in her
character as a spiritual authority, established by Christ the
Lord... ." 6 Unlike every other group or association, the Church
is a foundation, an association founded directly by Christ and
possessed of the unique rights with which He endowed it. Those
rights are summed up in the principle of the Libertas ecclesiae, as
it is called, the fundamental principle governing the relations
between the Church and all other groups and individuals. This
principle guarantees the freedom of operation, so to speak, of the
internal life of the Church, which includes teaching through
schools, works of charity though hospitals and such, celebration
of the sacraments, preaching of the Word to the faithful, and the
hierarchy's governance of the Church herself.
13 POPE PAUL VI, DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM DIGNITATIS HUMANAE
T{ 3 (1965) [hereinafter DIGNITATIS HUMANAE], available at http://www.vatican.val
archive/histscouncils/iivatican_council/documents/vat-iidecl_19651207_dignitatis-
humanaeen.html.
14 PAUL BLANSHARD, PAUL BLANSHARD ON VATICANII 89 (1966).
15 DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, supra note 13, 13.
16 Id.
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The liberty of the Church is not exhausted, however, by
these internal aspects for which she claims immunity from all
outside influence. No, there is this further claim as well, here in
the words of the Second Vatican Council, also in Dignitatis
Humanae: "The Church also claims freedom for herself in her
character as a society of men who have the right to live in society
in accordance with the precepts of the Christian faith."" Those
precepts include, naturally, the natural moral law. According to
the Second Vatican Council in its Constitution on the Church in
the Modern World, Gaudium et Spes: "Laymen should also know
that it is generally the function of their well-formed Christian
conscience to see that the divine law is inscribed in the life of the
earthly city."" The Dogmatic Constitution on the Church,
Lumen Gentium, teaches similarly: The layman is closely
involved in "temporal affairs" of every sort-it is therefore his
"special task" to illuminate and organize these affairs in such a
way that they may always start out, develop, and persist
"according to Christ to the praise of the Creator and the
Redeemer."19
In carrying out this work in the world, moreover, the laity
are to be guided by the teachings of the Church. This is the
domain of Catholic social doctrine, and its claim is impressive, as
John Courtney Murray elaborates:
It is our faith that the sacred things of God-not merely the
sacred things of the suprapolitical order (the Word, the
sacraments, the Christian law) but also the sacredness inherent
in human life-have been committed to the protection of a
potestas sacra resident in the Church.... This sacred power is
itself freedom's strong defense. Founded on the rights of God, it
is the last bulwark of the rights of man. Hence the Church
asserts her freedom in the use of this sacred power-her
17 Id.
18 PAUL VI, PASTORAL CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD
GAUDIUM ET SPES 43 (1965), available at http://www.vatican.valarchive/hist
councils/iivatican council/documents/vat-ii-cons_19651207gaudium-et-spes
en.html.
19 PAUL VI, DOGMATIC CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH LUMEN GENTIUM 1 31




freedom, in the case, to enter the political order, there to set the
protecting armature of her power about those things which
must be kept sacred, if man is to be free. 20
This the Church does, in large measure, by the lay faithful's
impressing upon the social order the truth about man and about
the Church, each as the Church teaches-which is not to suggest
that the Church's teaching is exhaustive or all of it possessed of
the same level of authority. The Church asserts its freedom
above all by informing the consciences of its members and
sending them forth into civil society with a moral mandate and,
of course, the counsel of prudence.
To sum up my first point, Vischer contends that
"[clonscience, by its very nature, directs our gaze outward,
to sources of formation, to communities of discernment, and
to venues for expression. "21 Vischer also anticipates-and
commends-"a marketplace in which moral convictions are
allowed to operate and compete without invoking the trump of
state power."" While Vischer's wish to rule out "the trump of
state power" is repeatedly and variously stated throughout the
book,2 3 his wish to rule out the "trump" of the Church remains
unstated. The Church's social doctrine does not teach that the
Church should trump by force, only that the Church has by
divine right a unique place in forming the consciences of the
faithful and by that route impressing the natural moral law on
the social order, a "trump" of a different sort, if one wishes to
speak in terms of tricks. In the eyes of Catholic social doctrine,
"deviant"2 4 associations-if by deviant we mean associations
whose aims and/or practices violate the moral law-do not have
rights against legitimate "centralized authority,"2 5 though it may
of course sometimes be prudent for that ruling authority to let
them alone.
One way by which the faithful can succeed in shaping the
social order along the lines sketched by Catholic social doctrine
is, to be sure, through the formation, maintenance, and
reformation of the associations and groups Vischer commends.
20 John Courtney Murray, Paul Blanshard and the New Nativism, 5 THE
MONTH 224-25 (Apr. 1951).
21 VISCHER, supra note 5, at 4.
22 Id. at 5.
21 Id. at 114.
24 Id. at 114-15.
25 Id. at 106.
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There is a risk, though, that in a commendable zeal to reclaim
the space between person and state, the state-or what I shall
prefer to call the civil or governing authority-will be denied its
proper role in civil society. Intriguingly, "state" does not so much
as appear in the book's index. "Person" suffers a similar fate,
though perhaps ameliorated by the entry for "personal integrity."
As we have already begun to see, however, Vischer does have a
theory of what the state ought-and ought not-to do. Most of
his focus is directed against variations on the Hobbesian theme
that all governing authority is held at the top, unless and until it
is dolloped out. This is a worthy target, to be sure, and I would
not wish to misrepresent Vischer as holding the view that the
central governing does not sometimes have a decisive role to
play. "For example," Vischer writes, "in today's market
economies, subsidiarity clearly contemplates effective labor
unions and a vigorous antitrust enforcement regime, both of
which require legislative action and oversight by a central
government authority."2 6 I suspect, however, that there is more
to be said on behalf of the civil ruling authority than Vischer has
been willing to allow. I can only offer a few indicators here, as I
turn to the second pole of Vischer's study.
The common good provides Vischer's principle criterion for
defining the role of the "state" or central governing authority.
What then does Vischer mean by the "common good?" Here is his
programmatic approach to his second pole:
The common good does not lend itself to easy definition . .. but
five different perspectives [subsidiarity, sphere sovereignty,
organic solidarity, the moral marketplace, and cultural
cognition] informed by philosophy, theology, and sociology help
fill out its content and clarify its connection with conscience. All
five aim to justify the decentralization of social power, including
moral authority.27
For purposes of saying what the common good is, Vischer has
hand-selected a list of five "perspectives" that "[a]ll . . . aim" to
justify decentralizing the governing authority.2 8 Why would this
be a promising heuristic for discovering the common good?
Again, the term has a set of historically attested meanings, some
of which are mutually inconsistent. What is the justification,
2 Id. at 106.




however, for taking up the topic of the common good by working
out the implications of principles of decentralization? Must we
not begin by attending to the implications of claim that there are
goods, some of which are truly common, and which may therefore
require the work of the common governing authority? Are there
not goods that are potentially common to all groups within civil
society? Or is the commonality of goods largely limited to
associations within civil society? Vischer seems to hold the latter
view, but on what ground?
I do not wish to understate the analytical difficulties
involved in giving an account of the common good, but I do wish
to highlight the ways in which Vischer is generally not talking
about the same thing the Catholic tradition has talked about in
terms of the common good. The disconnect is not complete, but it
comes pretty close to comparing apples and oranges, rather than
the aforementioned Fujis and Granny Smiths. Is systematic
distortion not the assured result when the concept of the common
good is deployed in a world stripped of goods that are truly
common-and not just to subsets of civil society? When inquiring
into goods, including the common good, do we not need to recall
that the good is that which perfects something as an end?
The traditional concept of the common good leads to a role
for the state that is far more robust than the one Vischer prefers.
In connection with formulating his classic definition of law, St.
Thomas Aquinas notes that the common good is made up of many
things-constat ex multis-including "justice, virtue, peace,
tranquility, friendship, communication, and communion.""
These are the objects and aims of law because, as St. Thomas
says in part of that classic definition, law just is an ordinance of
reason for the common good, and promulgated by him or them
that have authority over the political community.3 0 There is,
moreover, a priority among the elements of the common good. "It
seems clear," as Clifford Kossel, a contemporary commentator on
Aquinas explains, "that good order of the community, which
results in peace and tranquility, is the first aim of human law. It
is foundational; without it, people cannot live together.""1
29 Clifford G. Kossel, Natural Law and Human Law, in THE ETHICS OF AQUINAS
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Can Vischer abide this role for the governing authority? On
the one hand, he writes:
The state's self-restraint helps ensure that the common good is
not defined and imposed from above as either a uniform, fixed
norm or as an idiosyncratic product of office-holders' own moral
claims, but is instead realized from the bottom up, constituted
by the conscience-driven decisions and day-to-day actions of
individuals and the communities to which they belong.3 2
He then adds: "The state's self-restraint cannot be absolute, of
course, for the common good requires a level of social justice and
order that only state authority can ensure."33
Why have the scales been weighted in favor of a minimalist
state and against the conditions of multiple common goods? If we
are truly concerned about the common good, must we not also
ask-starting from the requirements of order and tranquility,
and moving out from those to other common goods-what
governing acts are required or desirable if the elements of the
common good are to be achieved? I see no reason to assume that
goods common to civil society will be achieved by groups, and
their members, doing their own thing. There is no necessary
objection to laws for the common good being promulgated "from
above"3 4 and no necessary reason to suppose that office holders
will be any more or less idiosyncratic than those souls that put
them into office. Kossel continues:
[The common good of order] may require many sets of laws to
order the various functional groups working for the common
good. (Ia IIae, q. 95, a. 4). The main requirement for such laws
is that they be just; especially they must observe distributive
justice by an equitable sharing of the burdens and rewards of
social life among the citizens according to function and merit.35
And these-a just peace, order, and tranquility-while good in
themselves, also serve the further ends of the growth of the other
common goods that are virtue and friendship. All of these are
shared goods, for which the governing authority is responsible
and that are to be achieved, when necessary and as appropriate,
through laws that only the governing authority can enact.
32 VISCHER, supra note 5, at 103.
33 Id.
34 Id.
3 Kossel, supra note 29 (citations omitted).
316
AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Catholic social doctrine follows Aquinas and others in
resisting the anarchist notion that "the state governs best that
governs least." As James Coleman has explained, summarizing a
hundred years of the tradition descending from Leo XIII:
Catholic social theory . .. does not denude the state of
essential authority. Rather the state represents the highest,
indispensable, and most responsible agency for determining the
common good .... Against liberalism Catholic social teaching
holds governments responsible for the well-being of society. The
Catholic concept of a "common good," which is something
structural and more than the mere additive summation of
individual goods, militates against the nightwatchman state of
classical liberalism.36
Catholic social theory does indeed also teach the relative
autonomy of intermediate groups and the value of plural social
forms and the correlative pluralism of authorities. Catholic
social doctrine does not, however, weight the scales in favor of
smallness. As Coleman explains,
[tihis principle of the autonomy of intermediate groups needs to
be juxtaposed against a no-less-strong counter-principle of state
authority; that is, wherever the welfare of a community requires
concerted common action, the unity of that common action must
be assured by the state. "No bigger than necessary" has as its
corollary "as big as needed to achieve the common good."3
These normative claims cannot, I think, be squared with the
following descriptive but verging-on-normative claim by Vischer
that "[t]oday, the separation between the state's judgment and
the citizenry's well-being is uncontroversial."38
The Church through her social doctrine wishes to controvert
any such separation, insisting instead that the governing
authority's role involves discerning and implementing the
requirements of the common good. Vischer does, predictably,
license the state to use its "coercive power" for the purposes of
preventing "actionable 'harm' or illegitimate market
interference."39 As one makes one's way through the chapters of
Conscience and the Common Good, though, one discovers that
36 John A. Coleman, Neither Liberal nor Socialist: The Originality of Catholic
Social Teaching, in ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF CATHOLIc SocIAL THOUGHT 25, 37
(John A. Coleman ed., 1991).
" Id. at 38.
3 VISCHER, supra note 5, at 118.
3 Id. at 119.
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what is missing above all is any sense that the principal reason
for an individual's subordination to civil society and its governing
authority is not an individual's personal fulfillment, including
protection from "harm" by others or even antitrust violations.
The excellent reason for that subordination is, rather, that the
principal objects of an individual's fulfillment are themselves
essentially common goods, such as the good of civic friendship.
For all this, though, I would not wish to leave the
impression, at least not yet, that I suspect Vischer of being a wolf
in the sheep's clothing of bottom-up localism and the autonomy of
groups to take non-harm causing actions. Vischer's concerns are
timely, even if some of the proposed solutions are, in my
estimation, overdrawn. If the governing authority proves itself to
be incapable of identifying and acting on behalf of the common
good, as some believe is the case today, the subordination which
would ordinarily be a good may turn out to be a rotten apple.
Meanwhile, however, it remains for the people not to shut down
the state and send Congress home but instead to elect
representatives who will govern so as to impose the requirements
of the common moral order on civil society.
Will our elected officials do as much? Perhaps, if they have
creditable reason to believe that the members of civil society will
hold them to account when they fail in that task. Will we hold
them to account? "The State," as Jacques Maritain explained, "is
the particular agency which specializes in matters dealing with
the common good of the body politic, . . . but the state is a part,
not a whole, . . . being a part in the service of the people, it must
be controlled by the people."o Maritain continues:
[Wlhen the people confer authority on their rulers, while
retaining through their elected representatives a serious control
over them, they give to them something-a right,-of which
they are not themselves either the author or the principle; for
every right is, as such, founded on the universal order which
God had in view [including truly common goods].41
The true wolf in sheep's clothing is a populace that has lost its
desire for truly common goods.
40 JACQUES MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 202 (Catholic University of America
Press 1998) (1951).
41 JACQUES MARITAIN, ON THE CHURCH OF CHRIST: THE PERSON OF THE
CHURCH AND HER PERSONNEL 63 (Joseph W. Evans trans., 1973).
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